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1 Introduction 
Supply chains, in particular telecom supply chains, have undergone major changes during 
the past decade and are still in turmoil. The uncertainty on the telecom market, and short 
product life cycles, make it very difficult to produce reliable forecasts of the required 
supply chain capacity.  
There are many causes of uncertainty in the demand and supply of telecom services: 
new operators emerging, and the introduction of new third-generation telecom systems 
that are subject to governmental regulations regarding timing and geographical coverage, 
are causing a very fast ramp-up in volume; large orders must be delivered simultaneously 
to remote areas in different countries; new consumers are continuously added, 
geographically (new countries) and in markets (e.g., transmission of data), in consumer 
segments (e.g., teenagers, children and senior citizens) and in technology (shift from 
second-generation to third-generation technology). On the whole, the telecom market is 
highly unpredictable and evolves very fast, making it extremely difficult to forecast 
demand accurately. Consequently, supply chain partners are constrained to undergo 
risks that grow quickly if not shared between actors and if the supply chain is not 
reactive. These risks include stock-outs, customer dissatisfaction, overstocks, expensive 
investments in technology that can become quickly obsolete, etc. 
One of the possible solutions for better decision-making and the improvement of local 
and global performances is the establishment of cooperation in the supply chain. Our 
approach consists in proposing a system and methodology to evaluate the risk of the 
actor’s behaviour (capacity-requirements–planning behaviour, supply behaviour) in 
relation to the performance of other actors and the supply chain. 
In the remainder of this paper, we first review the previous work on cooperation 
in supply chains (Section 2). Then, we outline the context of the study (telecom 
supply chain) and the research approach (Section 3). Later on, we detail the potential of 
the system we are developing (Section 4) and the methodology (Section 5) we propose 
to help manage the risks undergone and to improve performance. Then, we present 
(Section 6) the setup of this methodology based on an example. 
2 Previous work 
Recently, many organisations have emerged to encourage trading partners to establish 
collaborative interactions (that rationalise or integrate their demand forecasting/ 
management, and reconcile the order-book processes) and to provide standards 
(that could support collaboration processes): RosettaNet (Rosetta, 2005), Voluntary 
Inter-industry Commerce Standards Association (Cpfr, 2005; Nix et al., 2004), Odette, 
etc. At the same time, scientific literature provides many interesting papers dedicated to 
cooperation study and analysis. 
Moreover, many recent papers have been devoted to the study and analysis of 
cooperation in supply chains (Aviv, 2001; Agrawal and Seshadri, 2000; Cachon and 
Fisher, 2000; Cachon, 2001a; Dudek and Stadtler, 2004). Under the heading of 
cooperation, authors list several concepts, such as sales’ forecasts sharing (Aviv, 2001; 
Dudek and Stadtler, 2004), the supply chain actor’s agreement on inventory control, as in 
Axsäter (2001; 2003). In these papers, actors seek to improve the supply chain’s global 
performance and not only the local performance. Some studies focus on the case of two 
sites (a factory and its supplier) (Dudek and Stadtler, 2004; Telle, 2003) while others 
focus on configurations including a factory and several retailers (Cachon and Fisher, 
2000; Cachon, 2001a; Chen et al., 2001a; Chen et al., 2001b; Klastorin et al., 2002; 
Raghunathan, 2003; Dudeck and Stadtler, 2004). 
Cooperation is thus carried out on several aspects of the relationship, such as orders 
which are traditionally oversized. For example, in Cachon and Lariviere (2001b), the 
customer does not have confidence in his supplier capacity and thus places orders higher 
than his real need to be sure of satisfaction. The supplier, aware of such practices, 
deliberately produces a quantity lower than the orders to avoid overstocks. Consequently, 
all the quantities are false. To avoid this situation, a framework for sharing information 
was proposed. Similarly, a retailer who wants to minimise the unsold goods’ quantities 
orders lower quantities than what he thinks will be sold. Agrawal and Seshadri (2000) 
study a system for sharing risks in order to sell more goods and consequently increase the 
benefit. In the field of semiconductor manufacturing, Mallik and Harker (2004) study the 
problem of cooperation for capacity allocation using an intrafirm approach. 
Nevertheless, less attention has been devoted to the risk evaluation of these new 
collaborative processes. Therefore, we propose a simulation system (LogiRisk) and a 
methodology that should help decision-makers of telecom supply chains to define 
cooperation models on capacity planning. 
3 Context of the study and research approach 
This paper focuses on supply chains of electronic products dedicated to telephone and 
telecommunications. In these supply chains, products share the same mode of 
networking. They also share the same types of actors and the same mode of circulation of  
physical and informational flows. This work is motivated by the collaboration with a 
SemiConductor Supplier’s manager, who is concerned with setting up cooperation 
strategies in telecom supply chains. 
In the following sections, we consider a generic chain based on maximum similarities 
between the telecom supply chains. Apart from the final users, the supply chain under 
study (see Figure 1) calls upon five types of actors (Agrell et al., 2004): 
1 The Global Operators (GOs) (e.g., France Telecom, Vodafone, Telefonica) are 
responsible for the deployment of network coverage and associated services 
provided to the customers (Henten et al., 2003). 
2 The Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) (e.g., Nokia, Ericsson, Lucent) 
manufactures the different equipment: drivers, printers, monitors, mobile phones, 
etc. (Berggren and Bengtsson, 2004). 
3 The Electronics Manufacturing Services (EMS) provider  (e.g., Solectron, 
Flextronics) resells assembled products to some partners who incorporate them into 
their own configurations and market them under their own trademark (Chen et al., 
2004; Ren et al., 2003). 
4 The Second-Tier Supplier or SemiConductor Supplier (SCS) (e.g., Freescale, Philips, 
Texas Instrument) manufactures the basic electronic components (chips) used by the 
EMS (Mallik and Harker, 2004). 
5 The Third-Tier Suppliers are suppliers of raw materials needed in the fabrication of 
chips (e.g., silicon, chemical products). 
Figure 1 Telecom supply chain structure 
Source: Agrell et al. (2004) 
The products involved in a telecom supply chain (telecommunication infrastructure 
products, mobile phone, etc.) have very short life cycles requiring a strong reactivity on 
the part of the various actors in order for them to deliver the right quantities in the right 
time ‘window’. If the product is available only outside the right time ‘window’, several 
phenomena are observed: important price falls, sales volume falls, inventory 
obsolescence, etc. In short, one should note three main characteristics for the telecom 
supply chain (Insight Research Corporation, 2001; Lee, 2002; Agrell et al., 2004): 
1 Uncertainty of demand – the emergence of new actors in the supply chain (e.g., new 
global operators who enter the market and who consequently modify the distribution 
of the market shares), the uncontrolled exchange of information, the difficulties of 
the installation of reliable processes of coordination and collaboration in the chain 
and the absence of contractual structures binding the actors of the chain, which make 
the demand uncertain. 
2 Instability – the demand fluctuates according to season, fashion phenomena and 
national and international events. 
3 Short life cycle products – big technological shifts (shift from second-generation 
technology to third-generation technology) drastically reduce the product’s 
life cycle. 
All these factors generate a very big ramp-up of the demand, making it extremely 
difficult to develop accurate forecasts to anticipate market trends, and also making it 
difficult in general to develop efficient planning processes (demand planning, capacity 
planning, and so on). Added to that, we should notice that GO, OEM or EMS capacity 
can evolve rapidly. But SCS capacity changes are staggered, as they are dependent on 
heavy investments for the acquisition of wafer fabrication sites.  
This telecom business operational environment underlines the need for a cooperation 
process in capacity negotiation between the SCS actor and the rest of the supply chain. In 
this context, the approach we adopt consists in initiating a discussion between the 
decision-makers of different supply chain entities (i.e., enterprises) in order to propose 
cooperation models for the Sales and Operations Planning (S&OP) process elaboration. A 
simulation system is being developed to evaluate the impact of alternative cooperation 
models on supply chain performance in particular, according to different demand 
scenarios. These cooperation models are characterised by: 
• on the one hand, the content of the exchange or the sharing between the actors (data
such as forecasts, demand and inventory level, and/or treatment such as calculation
procedure, constraints and criteria)
• on the other hand, by the way in which the decision-makers do the exchange
or the sharing: occasional exchanges, permanent sharing, sequenced and
formalised exchanges.
Moreover, the characteristics of the telecom supply chain led us to be interested in the 
evaluation of the risks associated with more or less cooperation. Our objective is to help 
decisions-makers define a cooperation approach by iteratively estimating each of the 
actors’ risks: we mainly study the processes involved in setting up for capacity and the 
process of forecasts’ communication (see Section 6 for an example). Our focus is 
primarily on a customer/supplier relationship involving a SemiConductor Supplier and an 
Original Equipment Manufacturer. 
4 LogiRisk – a system for risk evaluation and collaboration enhancement 
In this section, we present the potential usefulness of LogiRisk and develop its 
methodology in setting up cooperation policies. Such policies result from the type and the 
quality of the information exchanged between the supply chain actors, and by the way the 
information is used by each actor for production and supply management. 
4.1 Relationship under study 
For simplicity, we focus on a customer/supplier relationship including: 
• a SemiConductor Supplier
• an Original Equipment Manufacturer.
In order to make the system complete, all the other customers of the SCS are aggregated 
and presented by one unique actor: ‘other OEMs’ with perfect supply behaviour (i.e., the 
sent orders are always identical to the transmitted supply plan) (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2 The customer/supplier relationship 
4.2 Actors’ behaviour models 
Capacity adjustment decisions are crucial for the SCS because of its long cycle times. 
Therefore, we are interested in capacity variation policies of the SCS (increasing or 
decreasing capacity). On the other hand, we suppose that the OEM is able to adapt its 
capacity whenever it is needed. So, the OEM focuses on its supply policies that are 
concerned with the forecasts it sends to the SCS compared to its original supply plan. 
For each entity, the modelled processes are given in Figure 3 and detailed below. The 
notations and equations that formalise these processes are gathered in Section 4.2.6. For 
simplicity, we suppose that the S&OP and the ‘Production Planning and Launching’ 
(PPL) processes are made at the same frequency (every n time periods). 
4.2.1 SCS’s sales and operation planning process and capacity policy 
During this process, the SCS makes its own interpretation of the supply plan and orders 
transmitted by the OEM to estimate its load for each planning period in the planning 
horizon. In the first step, the S&OP process is made with infinite capacity: no load 
smoothing is considered. This results in a capacity proposal that must be validated or 
modified by top management throughout their capacity policy. 
OEMSCS
Other OEMs
Orders, forecasts products
Equations (1–4) define the S&OP process made at time θ. 
Equation (1) defines the initial inventory of the S&OP planning. Equation (2) defines 
the suggested minimal quantity of lots to be launched. Equation (3) defines the suggested 
production to be launched. Equation (4) expresses the inventory balance between two 
successive periods. 
Figure 3 OEM and SCS processes models 
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At this point, the SCS decides the necessary capacity, Capaθt in Equation (5), basing on 
its capacity variation policy (function h(.)) and the estimated loads. Various functions h(.) 
will be detailed when defining the SCS decision-maker’s behaviour in the application. 
4.2.2 SCS’s production planning and launching 
With respect to the determined capacity, the SCS schedules its production and launches 
the production orders. Because of long lead times, the SCS orders its production and 
therefore launches its production using forecasts arising from its customers. 
Equations (6–9) define the Production Planning and Launching plans with respect to 
the determined capacity. They are an extension of the S&OP equations. 
4.2.3 SCS’s inventory management 
This process manages the real demand from the OEMs, the real inventory and the 
stock-outs between two planning processes (between time θ and time θ + n). It defines 
the initial data for the planning processes performed at time θ + n. Equations (10) and 
(11) express the real inventory and the stock-out from the inventory balance between two 
time periods. 
The total quantity delivered is given by the demanded quantity and the stock-out 
variation, as shown in Equation (12). 
We suppose the SCS delivers to its different customers a quantity which is 
proportional to their respective demands (Equations (13) and (15)). 
The stock-outs are the result of the difference of what was due and what has been 
delivered (Equations (14) and (16)). 
Finally, some of the planned orders are opened and will be available as schedule 
receipts in the next plans (Equation (17)). 
4.2.4 OEM supply policy 
This process transforms one original supply plan elaborated by the OEM , ,i tOA
θν  
according to the OEM supply policy, to a new supply plan it transmits to the SCS ,( ).i tA
θν  
Added to this supply plan, the OEM transmits supply orders (Di,θ) and receives in return 
the delivered quantities of products (Deli,θ). 
We consider that the OEM may introduce an anticipation (δ) expressed in time 
periods between the original supply plan and the transmitted one, as shown in 
Equation (18). 
4.2.5 Supply chain uncertainties 
Handling the dynamic nature of the supply chain requires the development of a 
simulation model. In the simulation, as time passes, new information becomes 
available. This new information is taken into account by the actors in their behaviour and 
decision process. 
Our simulation model, a Discrete-event Simulation model (Schriber and Brunner, 
1997), takes into account two distinct sources of uncertainty: the OEM demand and the 
SCS process (see Figure 4). 
Figure 4 A schematic view of the simulation model 
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Between two successive production-planning processes of the SCS (done at time θ and 
θ + n), new sets of firm orders and forecast orders will be received from the OEMs. The 
set of firm orders received between θ and θ + n will be added to the set of firm orders 
already planned at θ. On the other hand, forecast orders received between θ and θ + n 
will replace the forecast orders available at θ. Because the forecast orders known at θ + n 
will fit more or less with the set of firm orders known at θ, the uncertainty of demand is 
introduced into the simulation model (Equation (19)). 
In the same way, uncertainty of the SCS process means that open order (X )′  will not 
exactly result in Scheduled Receipt (SR) after a production lead time. This is translated in 
Equation (17.1), which replaces Equation (17). 
Therefore, function f(.) models the OEM uncertainty on demand, while function g(.) 
models the uncertainty in the SCS process. These might change depending on the type of 
scenario decision-makers want to simulate. Examples of functions f(.) and g(.) are 
presented in the application. 
4.2.6 Actor’s behaviour equations 
Let us consider the following notations: 
θ = date at which a planning process is realised 
T = horizon of the planning process 
n = number of time periods between two planning processes 
N = set of finished products sold by the SCS to the OEMs 
Di,t (resp. Doi,t) = firm orders of product i purchased by the OEM (resp; Other  
 OEMs) at time t 
,i tOA
θν  = original supply plan that the OEM computes at time θ before the  
 application of its supply policy 
,i tA
θν  = (resp. ,i tA oθν ) forecast orders of product i for time t transmitted by  
 the OEM (resp. ‘other OEMs’) 
δ = OEMs’ anticipation of its original supply plan to transmit it to 
 the SCS 
,i tSR
θ  = Schedule Receipt during period t of already open orders of item i  
 at time θ 
,iI θ  = real inventory of item i at the beginning of time θ 
,iI θ  = stock-out of item i at the beginning of timeθ 
Loti = a produced quantity must be a multiple of this lot size 
li = minimum lead time of item i 
rj = SCS Capacity ramp-up must be a multiple of this value 
,Capai t
θ  = SCS Capacity during time period t computed at time θ and
 allocated to product i. 
∆ = anticipation of the capacity compared to the planned load 
Lj = minimal lead time between the decision to acquire resource j, and  
 the availability of the new capacity 
, , ( . )i t i tX resp X
θ θ′  = production quantity of item i to launch in production during time  
 period t with infinite (resp. finite) capacity 
,  ( . )i t itI resp I
θ θ′  = estimated inventory of item i at the beginning of time t with  
 infinite (resp. finite) capacity 
, , ( . )i t i tk resp k
θ θ′  = minimal number of lots of item i to be produced during time t  
 with infinite (resp. finite) capacity 
Dli,t = total quantity of item i delivered to the SCS customers 
, ,1 2
(resp. )
i i
I I
θ θ
− −  = shortage of item i for the OEM (resp. for the ‘other OEMs’) at  
 time θ 
Dl1 i,θ (resp. Dl2 i,θ) = Quantities of item i delivered to the OEM (resp. ‘Other OEMs’) 
 at time θ 
[]+ = the upper integer positive value operator 
, , ,i i iI I I
θ
θ θ θ
−= − for t∈[θ,θ + T]       (1) 
( ), , , , ,i t i t i t i t i t
i
k Av Avo SR I lot
θ θ θ θ θ
+⎡ ⎤= + − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
for t∈[θ,θ + T]       (2) 
, , ii t i t l i
X k lotθ θ += × for t∈[θ,θ + T]       (3) 
, 1 , , , , ,ii t i t i t l i t i t i t
I I X Av Avo SRθ θ θ θ θ θ+ −= + − − + for t∈[θ,θ + T]       (4) 
, , , ,, ,
n
i t i t i t i t
i i
Capa h X X Capaθ θ θ θ −
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑  for t∈[θ,θ + T]       (5) 
, , ,i i iI I I
θ
θ θ θ
−′ = − (6)
( ), , , , ,i t i t i t i t i t
i
k I Av Avo SR lot
θ θ θ θ θ
+⎡ ⎤′ ′= − − +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
for all t∈[θ,θ + T]       (7) 
, , ,min( ;  )ii t i t l i i tX k lot Capa
θ θ θ
+′ ′= ×  for all t∈[θ,θ + T]       (8) 
, 1 , , 1 , , ,ii t i t i t i t i t i t
I I X Av Avo SRθ θ θ θ θ θ+ −′ ′ ′= + − − + for all t∈[θ,θ + T]       (9) 
1, 1 , , , , , ,
(0;  )i t i t i t l i t i t i t i tI MAX I X SR D Do I
θ θ −
+ −′= + + − − −  for t∈[θ, θ + n – 1]       (10) 
, 1 , 1 , , , , , ,( )ii t i t i t i t l i t i t i t i tI I I X SR D Do I
θ θ− −
+ + −′= − + + − − −  for t∈[θ, θ + n – 1]       (11) 
, , , , , 1i t i t i t i t i tDl D Do I I
− −
+= + + − for t∈[θ, θ + n – 1]       (12) 
, ,1 , , 1 , , ,
(( ) /( ))
i t i ti t i t i t i t i t
Dl Dl D I D Do I− −= + + +  for t∈[θ, θ + n – 1]       (13) 
, 1 , ,1 , 1 1i t i t i ti t
I D I Dl
+
− −= + − for t∈[θ, θ + n – 1]       (14) 
, ,2 , , 2 , , ,
(( ) /( ))
i t i ti t i t i t i t i t
Dl Dl D I D Do I− −= + + + for t∈[θ, θ + n – 1]       (15) 
, 1 , ,2 , 2 2i t i t i ti t
I Do I Dl
+
− −= + − for t∈[θ, θ+n – 1]       (16) 
, , ,i i
n
i t l i t l i tSR SR X
θ θ θ+
+ + ′= +  for t∈[max(θ,θ + n – li),θ + n]      (17) 
, , ,( )i i
n
i t l i t l i tSR SR g X
θ θ θ+
+ + ′= +  for t∈[max(θ,θ + n–li),θ + n]   (17.1) 
, ,i t i tAv OAv
θ θ
δ+= for all i, θ and t > θ      (18) 
, ,( )i t i tD f OAv
θ= for all i, θ and θ ≤ t < θ + n      (19) 
4.3 Performance indicators of the simulation 
Simulations’ performance indicators aim at tracing the various types of cost incurred by 
the SCS and the OEM. They are synthesised in Table 1: 
Table 1 Performance indicators of the simulation 
SCS stock holding cost 
,, i tS i s
t i
H h I+ += ⋅∑∑
SCS stock-out cost 
, ,s i s i t
t i
H h I− − −= ⋅∑∑
OEM stock-out cost 
, ,1o i o i t
t i
H h I− − −= ⋅∑∑
Capacity acquisition cost 
[ , ]
s s t
t n
Ac ac rθ
θ θ θ∈ +
= ⋅∑ ∑  
SCS labour cost 
,
[ , ]
i ts s
t n i
Lc lc X
θ
θ θ θ∈ +
= ⋅∑ ∑ ∑
where: 
,i sh
+  = unitary SCS holding cost of product i 
,i sh
−  = unitary SCS stock-out cost of product i 
,i oh
−  = unitary OEM stock-out cost of product i 
acs = SCS capacity acquisition cost corresponding to one ramp-up (rj) 
lcs = SCS unitary labour cost 
tr
θ  = capacity ramp-up number at period t determined by the plan processed atθ. 
5 LogiRisk and its associated methodology 
The cooperation process using LogiRisk can be described (Figure 5) in a five-step 
methodology (Telle et al., 2003): 
1 In Step 1, the concerned decision-makers together select the problem to be 
considered, and the model of the customer/supplier relationship(s) under study is 
built. For example, the problem under study could be the evaluation of the risks 
related to the transmission of optimistic or pessimistic supply plans.  
2 In Step 2, the simulation experimental process is defined simultaneously by the two 
actors, depending on the problem to be studied. The cooperation policies to be 
considered are defined. A set of simulations is planned. 
3 Step 3 consists in running a series of simulations. 
• For each policy, each actor defines the values of the parameters associated with
the policy.
• The system performs simulations and computes the global and individual risks
of the policy.
4 In Step 4 each actor will individually be able to analyse the risks of the policies. 
5 On the other hand, in Step 5 a common analysis on the basis of global indicators will 
allow the validation of the chosen cooperation process. 
Figure 5 Implementation methodology 
6 Implementation of the methodology based on an example 
6.1 Selection of the problem 
The problem under study is the setting up of the capacity for the SemiConductor Supplier 
and the forecasts’ communication process for the Original Equipment Manufacturer. 
Each product has its own dedicated manufacturing process. 
6.2 Building the simulation experimental process 
In this implementation, the SCS either aligns the capacity with the planned load 
(Equation (20a)) or maintains the capacity previously defined (Equation (20b)). It can 
also anticipate the capacity of a ∆. Finally, when the available capacity is not sufficient, 
the capacity is allocated to each product according to its proportion of the planned load. 
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Different policies for changing the capacity will be considered for the SCS. 
1 The capacity is aligned at time t with the planned load. The acquired extra capacity is 
equal to the minimum number of ‘capacity ramp-up’ increments that enable the 
planned production: ∆ = 0, Lj ≠ 0. 
2 A fixed capacity is maintained throughout the planning process: ∆ = 0, Lj ≠ ∞. 
3 The capacity is increased ∆ periods before the planned load needs it. The amount of 
extra capacity acquisition corresponds to a minimum number of ‘capacity ramp-up’ 
enabling the required production: ∆ > 0, Lj ≠ 0. 
For the OEM, two main policies are considered: 
1 The OEM supply plan is reliable (the orders and the OEM original supply plan are 
similar), and the following communication policies are considered in Equation (18): 
• The supply plan transmitted to the SCS is identical to the original OEM supply
plan: δ = 0.
• The supply plan transmitted to the SCS is late compared to the original OEM
supply plan: δ > 0.
• The supply plan transmitted to the SCS is advanced compared to the original
OEM supply plan: δ < 0.
2 The original OEM supply plan is communicated to the SCS as it is (δ = 0 in 
Equation (18)), but it is not reliable (Equation 19). Two cases are considered: 
• The OEM supply plans a supply rise whereas the transmitted orders remain
stable: f(x) = constant.
• The OEM supply plan envisages a rise whereas the transmitted orders fall:
f(x) = constant –x.
6.3 Entering parameters and running the simulation 
At this step, decision-makers feed LogiRisk with the parameters associated with the 
policies and data and each runs its simulation.  
In our example, the planning parameters are set out in Table 2. Table 3 gives the 
respective unitary costs for the SCS and the OEM. 
Table 2 Planning parameters 
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6.4 SCS risk analysis 
For each of its policies, the SCS defines a number of possible scenarios of the 
OEM behaviour. 
The probability of occurrence of these scenarios is evaluated according to the SCS 
expertise on the five-rank scale given by Table 4. 
Table 4 Probability assessment scale 
Rank Subjective estimate Description 
1 Very unlikely Very rare event 
2 Improbable There is indirect evidence of event 
3 Moderate There is direct evidence of event 
4 Probable There is strong direct evidence of event 
5 Very probable Event recurs frequently 
The performance corresponding to each scenario can be evaluated thanks to the LogiRisk 
simulations. Thereafter, the risks related to the choice of such a policy can be computed. 
The SCS evaluates the risks of the following policies: 
1 SCS Policy 1 – consisting in increasing the capacity as soon as the planned load 
exceeds the capacity. 
2 SCS Policy 2 – maintaining a fixed capacity. 
3 SCS Policy 3 – the capacity is increased ∆ = 1 periods before the planned load 
exceeds the capacity, depending on different scenarios: 
• Scenario 1 – the OEM supply order trends are identical (δ = 0 and f(x) = x) to
that indicated by the transmitted supply plan (the original supply plan, which is
reliable, is transmitted).
• Scenario 2 – the OEM supply plan transmitted to the SCS is late compared to
the real supply plan of the OEM (δ = –1 and f(x) = x) and the supply orders
follow the original supply plan.
• Scenario 3 – the OEM supply plan transmitted to the SCS is advanced compared
to the real supply plan of the OEM (δ = 1 and f(x) = x) and the supply orders
follow the original supply plan.
• Scenario 4 – the OEM supply orders remain stable, whereas the transmitted
supply plan (the original supply plan, which is poor, is transmitted) envisages a
rise (δ = 0 and f(x) = constant).
• Scenario 5 – the OEM supply orders fall, whereas the supply plan the OEM
transmitted (he transmits the original supply plan, which is poor) envisages a
rise (δ = 0 and f(x) = constant –x).
Table 5 gives the corresponding risk evaluation for each of the SCS policies mentioned 
above. This risk evaluation is associated with the probability indexes defined below. 
Table 5 SCS policies evaluation 
SCS Policy 1 
Probability 
indexes 
Stock 
holding 
cost 
Stock-out 
cost 
Capacity 
acquisition 
cost 
Labour 
cost 
Scenario 
cost Criticality 
Scenario 1 4     0     0 2,000 124,600 126,600   506,400 
Scenario 2 1     0  8,000 2,000 124,600 134,600   134,600 
Scenario 3 2  1,200     0 2,000 123,900 127,100   254,200 
Scenario 4 1  6,600     0 2,000 120,400 129,000   129,000 
Scenario 5 1 13,200     0 2,000 116,200 131,400   131,400 
SCS Policy 1 total cost  1,155,600 
SCS Policy 2 
Scenario 1 4 0 29,000    0 117,600 146,600   586,400 
Scenario 2 1 0 37,000    0 117,600 154,600   154,600 
Scenario 3 2 0 22,000    0 117,600 139,600   279,200 
Scenario 4 1 0     0    0 117,600 117,600   117,600 
Scenario 5 1  8,700     0    0 116,200 124,900   124,900 
SCS Policy 2 total cost 1,262,700 
SCS Policy 3 
Scenario 1 4  1,800     0 2,000 125,160 128,960   515,840 
Scenario 2 1     0  2,000 2,000 125,160 129,160   129,160 
Scenario 3 2  3,900     0 2,000 125,160 131,060   262,120 
Scenario 4 1 10,500     0 2,000 125,160 137,660   137,660 
Scenario 5 1 13,200     0 2,000 116,200 131,400   131,400 
SCS Policy 3 total cost 1,176,180 
The results above show that the SCS minimises his risks if he increases his capacity as 
soon as the planned load exceeds capacity (Policy 1). This is logical, since this policy 
insures cost savings at inventory and capacity levels. The risk in choosing Policy 3 is 
greater because it generates greater holding costs. Finally, the risk related to the choice of 
Policy 2 seems the greatest because the fixed capacity is so low that it could not cover the 
orders. This would not be true if Scenario 1 was not really the most probable. In short, the 
occurrence probabilities that the decision-maker defines, depending on his expertise, very 
much influence the conclusions he can gather. So this evaluation has to be done a priori. 
6.5 The OEM risk analysis 
In the same way as in Section 6.4, for each of his policies, the OEM defines a number of 
possible scenarios of the SCS policies. The probability of occurrence of these scenarios is 
evaluated using his expertise. The performance corresponding to each scenario can be 
evaluated thanks to the LogiRisk simulations. Thereafter, the risks related to the choice of 
each OEM policy can be computed. 
The OEM evaluates the risks of the following policies:  
1 OEM Policy 1 – the supply plan transmitted to the SCS is identical to the 
orders (δ = 0). 
2 OEM Policy 2 – the supply plan transmitted to the SCS is identical to the orders but 
late (δ = –1). 
3 OEM Policy 3 – the supply plan transmitted to the SCS is equal to the orders but 
advanced (δ = 1) depending on different scenarios: 
• Scenario 1 – the SCS makes the choice of a policy consisting in increasing the
capacity as soon as the planned load exceeds the capacity.
• Scenario 2 – the SCS makes the choice of fixing its capacity.
• Scenario 3 – the SCS makes the choice of anticipating the needed quantities.
Table 6 gives the corresponding risk evaluation for each of the SCS policies mentioned 
above. This risk evaluation is associated to the probability vector defined below. 
Table 6 OEM policies evaluation 
OEM Policy 1  Probability indexes Stock-out cost Scenario cost Criticality 
Scenario 1 5    0    0    0 
Scenario 2 1  28,815  28,815  28,815 
Scenario 3 3    0    0    0 
OEM Policy 1 total cost  28,815 
OEM Policy 2 
Scenario 1 5    0    0    0 
Scenario 2 1 244,893 244,893 244,893 
Scenario 3 3    0    0    0 
OEM Policy 2 total cost 244,893 
OEM Policy 3 
Scenario 1 5  12,841  12,841  64,205 
Scenario 2 1  28,815  28,815  28,815 
Scenario 3 3   8,461   8,461  25,383 
OEM Policy 3 total cost 118,403 
The results above show that the OEM may perhaps find it beneficial to choose Policy 1. 
Policy 2, which consists in sending a procurement plan which is late compared to the 
orders, does not allow the SCS to see the rise of the market and then to make the 
deliveries at the good times. Consequently, important stock-outs occur on the OEM 
side. This happens if one decides to choose a policy minimising the risk. If one decides 
to choose a policy minimising the maximum risk, then Policy 1 and Policy 3 are the ones 
to choose. 
6.6 Build cooperation process 
When commenting on the results of the simulation, both the SCS and the OEM actors can 
discuss their policies. What can be seen in our very simple example is that confidence 
leads to better results for both actors. Moreover, when an actor chooses a policy, 
simulations show the choices that his partner is induced to make: a biased policy induces 
another biased policy at the partner level. 
Usually, actors justify their policies because of market uncertainty and 
unpredictability. LogiRisk enables us to show that even in an unstable environment, it is 
more reliable to offer clarity and transparency to the partners of the supply chain. 
7 Conclusion 
In this paper we have presented a system and set up a methodology to help and improve 
on the local and global performances in a two-stage telecom supply chain by convincing 
the different supply chain actors to set up cooperation policies. Future work should be 
devoted to more development of the actors’ models and behaviour. Similarly, the 
approach can be consolidated by some pilot projects involving two decision-makers 
belonging to an OEM and a SCS company. 
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